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ABSTRACT
We here present both experimental and theoretical results for an Anticipation Game, a two-stage game
wherein the standard Dictator Game is played after a matching phase wherein receivers use the past
actions of dictators to decide whether to interact with them. The experimental results for three different
treatments show that partner choice induces dictators to adjust their donations towards the expectations
of the receivers, giving significantly more than expected in the standard Dictator Game. Adding noise
to the dictators’ reputation lowers the donations, underlining that their actions are determined by the
knowledge provided to receivers. Secondly, we show that the recently proposed stochastic evolutionary
model where payoff only weakly drives evolution and individuals can make mistakes requires some
adaptations to explain the experimental results. We observe that the model fails in reproducing the
heterogeneous strategy distributions. We show here that by explicitly modelling the dictators’ probability
of acceptance by receivers and introducing a parameter that reflects the dictators’ capacity to anticipate
future gains produces a closer fit to the aforementioned strategy distributions. This new parameter
has the important advantage that it explains where the dictators’ generosity comes from, revealing that
anticipating future acceptance is the key to success.
1
Introduction1
Literature on biological markets1–3 and competitive altruism4, 5 has revealed that partner choice (or2
selection) provides an important mechanism to explain the sustained levels of cooperation and fairness3
within the context of social dilemmas. Partner selection is described as a method that allows individuals4
belonging to one group to select a partner among the members of another group, preferentially attaching5
to those that are considered to be the most advantageous for the situation. As the potential partners are6
fully aware of this selection process they will, when required, adapt their behaviour in order to become7
more attractive, generating in a sense competition among themselves.8
A number of biological market models were recently introduced to explain the generosity typically9
observed in the context of gift-giving games like the Dictator Game (DG) and modified versions of it.610
In the DG,7, 8 a dictator receives an endowment that she has to divide between herself and the other11
player, the receiver. In the standard format of the game the receiver cannot take any action, obtaining12
whatever the dictator wishes to give. Literature shows that in that scenario more than 60% of subjects13
pass a positive amount of money, with the mean transfer approaching 20% of the endowment.9 Whether14
this non-zero amount is given for altruistic or selfish reasons is still under debate.10 Nonetheless, the DG15
shows that human populations are more generous than what is expected from a population of rational16
and selfish payoff maximising individuals. The aforementioned biological market models argue that17
this dictator generosity is the result of a combination of partner selection, the demography of the two18
classes of individuals (dictators and receivers) and the resource division. They furthermore contrasted19
their work with the analysis performed by Nowak and colleagues,11 arguing that the balanced outcome20
observed in that case, which is defined in the context of the Ultimatum Game (UG), is a consequence of21
an a priori restriction of the parameter space and would have lead to an unfair outcome in favour of the22
receivers without that restriction. They question the evidence provided by this model for the importance of23
reputation as a proximate explanation for the evolution of generous behaviour.24
Here we go beyond this prior work by first providing experimental insights into how humans behave25
in a modified DG wherein prior to playing that game receivers have the possibility to decide whether26
they accept a given dictator, using information on the dictator’s actions in previous rounds to make that27
decision. Then we show that in order to identify the origins of the generosity observed in different versions28
of that experiment one needs to consider that dictators have acquired the capacity to anticipate, using an29
extension of the stochastic evolutionary model presented by Rand et al12 to make this point.30
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Thus prior to playing the DG, a receiver can decide whether or not to play the game with a proposed31
dictator. Receivers do not select their preferred partner among the full set of dictators as is assumed in32
biological markets. Neither do we use specific matching algorithms as discussed in.13 At each round33
receivers and dictators are paired-up randomly and then each receiver decides whether she wishes to34
play the DG with the suggested dictator or not. By accepting the proposed dictator, both players will35
gain a payoff equal to the amount that they will receive from playing the game, whereas, when choosing36
to reject the proposed dictator both players will gain zero payoff. On one hand, this game follows a37
basic model discussed by Andre´ and Baumard,6 yet simplifies the receivers’ choice to either accepting or38
rejecting a proposed dictator. This form of partner selection thus reduces the mechanism to its weakest39
form, providing a lower limit of what can be expected in terms of donation levels within this context.40
On the other hand, our experiments highlight the role of reputation for the generosity of dictators since41
receivers will decide to accept dictators based on a variety of social cues. This setup differs from the42
reputation-based model11 where the reputation was assigned to receivers. As the dictator is aware that a43
future matched receiver will obtain certain social clues about her past, she may anticipate how to behave in44
order to be a more attractive partner, while at the same time benefiting the most from this social interaction.45
No experimental results exist that show the level of dictator generosity and the probability of receiver46
acceptance in this kind of game, which we will refer to as the Anticipation Game (AG) in the remainder of47
this text.48
We aim to show experimentally how different social cues influence the level of dictator donations in49
the AG as well as the heterogeneous distribution of dictator strategies one can observe. Especially the50
latter is of interest as it provides insights into a diversity of human generosity levels,14, 15 which range51
from players that keep the maximum of the endowment even when this affects their social reputation to52
individuals that give more with varying degrees of generosity. Prior modelling work pays little attention to53
this heterogeneity. It was only recently suggested that the variation and imbalance between in donation54
may be due to how dictators perceive the ownership of the initial endowment.3 Four different treatments55
are performed: A baseline treatment (treatment 1) that re-examines the DG, which is used for comparison,56
and three AG treatments wherein receivers approve their matching with a certain dictator based on different57
pieces of information. Every AG treatment consists of 30 rounds, wherein dictators and receivers are58
matched randomly. In every round, the receiver will need to decide whether she wishes to accept or not the59
given dictator using information about the past actions or reputation of her proposed dictator. When the60
receiver refuses to play both individuals will, as mentioned earlier, receive zero payoff and have to wait61
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for the next round of the game. The dictator, knowing that what she gives now might be observable by62
receivers in the future, has to decide how much to give from the endowment of 10 Experimental Currency63
Units (ECUs) she is given at the start of every round, with the smallest donation equal to 1. The minimum64
of 1 ECU is required as a donation of 0 ECU would create 2 subgame perfect equilibria (see Figure S165
in Supplementary Material) and hence a receiver could be indifferent between playing or not playing66
the game. As the dictator knows that the experiment takes multiple rounds, where in each round her67
past actions will be made explicit to the receiver, this voluntary matching introduces an explicit strategic68
concern about future interactions for the dictator.69
The three AG treatments differ in the information provided to the receiver after the initiation phase70
(see Methods and Supplementary Material). In the first AG treatment (treatment 2), the receivers can71
observe only the amounts given in the last three rounds when the dictator was accepted to play and use it72
to decide whether to play or not with her. In the second AG treatment (treatment 3), information on the73
number of times a dictator was refused by receivers was also added to the history, providing additional74
information on his or her reputation. In the last AG treatment (treatment 4 or noisy AG), which is also an75
adaptation of treatment 2, there is 50% chance in each round that a receiver does not know the amounts76
given by the matched dictator, having to make an uninformed decision on whether to play or not play77
with the given dictator. Dictators were informed about the presence or absence of this information for78
the receiver. Next to the average donation levels and strategy distributions we analyse also the receivers’79
acceptance rate in order to understand when a dictator is likely to be considered as partner. The results of80
the noisy AG experiment will reveal the importance of having information on the dictator’s reputation for81
the donation levels.82
As argued earlier, we provide also an evolutionary explanation for the origins of the observed results83
different from the biological market mechanisms provided in the literature. We adopt a stochastic84
evolutionary model based on the one recently proposed for the UG by,12 as opposed to the the deterministic85
infinite population models suggested in.6 The idea of this stochastic model is to explain the average86
behaviour within these experiments through changes in selection strength and mutation rate, in distinction87
to Other-Regarding Preferences (ORP) models16–18 that aim to explain behaviour in terms of altruistic and88
envy parameters based on inequity aversion. The difference with the ORP models is that this stochastic89
model does not make any individual fairness or rationality assumptions: The main observation made by1290
within the context of the Ultimatum Game (UG) was that when selection is not strong, meaning that the91
gains from the game do not strongly influence individual survival, allowing for chance to influence the92
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evolutionary dynamics, the average behaviour of proposers and responders in the UG nicely matches the93
experimental observations. Here we use the mathematical model to determine the parameter conditions94
that match our DG and AG results. However, even if the average behaviour can be nicely reproduced by95
the model for wide range of parameter settings, this stochastic evolutionary model ignores and fails to96
capture the real motivations of the dictators towards increased generosity. Moreover, the rather smooth and97
broad strategy distributions reproduced by the model do not match closely to the experimental ones. To98
overcome these issues we explicitly take into account the acceptance behaviour of the receivers in the AG99
as well as the impact of the dictators’ current decisions on future acceptance by newly matched receivers.100
By linking both experimental and theoretical results, we reveal here the real incentives behind dictators101
generosity, i.e. the strategic anticipation of ensuring a future interaction. In addition, the results show that102
reputation information is essential to maintain the level of generosity, providing evidence for reputation as103
a mechanism that leads to ”fair” outcomes as suggested in.11104
Results105
Experimental results for DG and all AG treatments106
Although the subgame perfect equilibrium in a population of rational and selfish payoff maximizing107
individuals playing the DG is to give the minimum (positive) amount, the average donation within the108
treatment 1 (averaged over all 30 rounds) is close to 2.2 ECUs, which means that dictators keep on average109
less than 8 ECUs for themselves (see Figure 1A). This deviation reveals the generosity of the dictators110
towards the receivers, highlighting the ORP16 intrinsic to the individuals involved in this experiment.111
Switching to the AG clearly changes the amount given by the dictators (see treatments 2, 3 and 4 in112
Figure 1A): The average amount given becomes ≈ 4.2 ECUs in the treatment 2 and 3 and ≈ 3.5 ECUs in113
treatment 4, deviating significantly from the subgame perfect equilibrium of the AG, which is equal to 1,114
as can be inferred by backward induction (Figure S1B). Moreover, receivers do not accept their partner in115
every matching, as is visualised for all AG treatments in Figure 1B. Hence, adding voluntary formation116
of couples to the DG leads to an increase in the average donations and introduces substantial levels of117
rejections, as was expected.118
Although there is no significant difference between the amounts given in treatments 2 and 3, there is a119
small, but significant difference between the acceptance rates for those treatments, as can be observed in120
Figure 1B. When adding the information on the number of times the matched dictator was refused by other121
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receivers, the acceptance rate increases, on average, from 83% to 89%. The receivers’ acceptance/rejection122
rate is most likely due to a change in their expectations. One could hypothesise that the additional123
information in treatment 3 alters the receivers beliefs about their opponent in such a way that they are124
more likely to accept the match.125
Treatment 4 shows clearly that when receivers are not continuously informed (and dictators are aware126
of this), the average donation decreases (see Figure 1A). The exploitation of this situation by dictators127
becomes clear when comparing the donations in situations where the receiver was or was not informed128
about the past behaviour of the dictator (see Figure S5A in Supplementary Material). Our results reveal that129
there is again a significant difference in the amounts given by the dictators in both scenarios. Nonetheless,130
the amounts given in case the receiver was not informed do not drop completely to the level of the DG. The131
reason for this is due to the definition of the AG: As the amount given by the dictator in the uninformed132
case is still added to the history, dictators cannot give too little as such actions might be observed by133
another receiver in future interactions, leading potentially to a refusal to play the game. Interestingly,134
one can also observe that in the uninformed situation, receivers tend to accept more easily a dictator (see135
Figure S5B in Supplementary Material), yet acceptance is not 100%, which would be the rational thing to136
do.137
As there is a clear difference between the amounts given in DG and AG, one can see the impact of138
this strategic motivation on the heterogeneity of the dictators’ behaviours. Figures 1C-E show, for all139
treatments, the dictators’ donation distributions. Whereas in treatment 1 the majority of the participants140
donate 1 or 2 ECUs to the receiver, the majority of the participants give 4 or 5 ECUs in the treatments 2 and141
3, and 3 or 4 ECUs in treatment 4. This difference between the DG and AG is most likely the consequence142
of dictators’ concerns towards future encounters: As the amounts they give appear in their history they143
influence the probability of being accepted in the next rounds by another receiver. The difference between144
the DG and AG treatments reveals that dictators are willing to sacrifice a part of their payoff in order to145
create a favourable reputation. This generosity in the AG treatments is clearly strategic as the dictators146
give in the last round exactly the same as what they would give in the DG (see round 30 in Figure 1A).147
Stochastic model parameters are predictive for the average behaviour in all games148
Given these results for the DG and AG, we first examine for which parameter values of the standard149
stochastic evolutionary dynamics model12 one obtains the closest fitting with the treatment results. As150
was argued, this stochastic evolutionary model allows one to explain the outcome of a game by only151
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considering how stochastic effects may lead to the behavior observed in experiments.152
We assume first that the behaviour of a dictator is defined by an integer value p ∈ [1,10] and the153
receiver’s behaviour by another integer value q ∈ [1,10]. A dictator’s strategy simply specifies the amount154
she is willing to give to a receiver (in both DG and AG). A receiver’s strategy in the AG, which results in155
either the action “play” or “not play”, is conditional in the sense that q specifies the minimum amount156
expected in order to accept the matching with a given dictator. The receiver’s decision is based on the157
information provided after matching, i.e. the amount given in the previous rounds of the AG. For example,158
when a receiver with a threshold of expecting at least q = 4 encounters a dictator that gave p = 3 on159
average in the previous rounds, she will not accept the matching. We assume also that receivers have160
perfect information, meaning that they can always correctly infer the amount that would be given in the161
game by the dictator. In the context of the DG, a receiver’s strategy set contains only the “play” strategy,162
since she cannot make any decision to prevent the interaction.163
Secondly, to capture also treatment 4, we introduce ω ∈ [0,1], defining the likelihood that the receiver164
will know the last or average action (i.e. p) of her partner. Where ω = 0 provides us with the results165
for the DG, ω = 1 gives us the AG as used in treatment 2. As q defines the conditional strategy of the166
receiver in case they know the past donation p of the dictator, we only need to specify what they will167
do when no information is provided. For the sake of simplicity, we assume in the model that when168
no information is present each receiver expects no more than the average donation of the DG. As a169
consequence, the expectation of a receiver is a weighted combination of her original q, for the case when170
the dictator’s history is available (ω), and this baseline ECU when the history is not available (1−ω). A171
detailed analysis concerning the motivation for this choice and different values for ω is provided in the172
Supplementary Material (see Figures S5 and S6).173
Finally, to remain close to the experimental setup, players cannot change role. Consequently, the174
stochastic evolutionary dynamics model for the AG consists of two finite populations, one for the dictators175
and one for the receivers. We focus here on finite population evolutionary dynamics,19, 20 where each176
population contains N = 100 individuals and every game takes place between a randomly selected pair,177
one from each population (see Methods). In case of the DG, only the strategies of the dictators are relevant,178
thereby requiring only one population. Figure S3 in the Supplementary Material reveals in detail the179
stationary distribution and the fixation probabilities of the standard Dictator Game for the value of β that180
fits best with the experimentally observed average donation of 2.2 ECUs, i.e. β = 10−2.2.181
In Figure 2A the average amounts given (p) in the DG, AG and noisy AG by dictators and the182
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expected amounts by receivers (q) in the two AG models are visualised for varying selection strengths183
(β ∈ [10−4,100]). One can observe, when selection is very weak (β < 10−3) and thus evolutionary184
dynamics is mostly driven by neutral drift, that every donation level remains abundant with almost equal185
frequencies, resulting in average donations above 5 ECUs. Increasing selection strength (β ∈ [10−3,10−1[)186
reduces p and q from more generous donations and higher expectations to the subgame perfect equilibrium187
in all games, which is maintained for all higher levels of selection strength (β ≥ 10−1). Similarly to the188
observations made for the UG,12 the disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversions are recovered189
for a wide range of stochastic evolutionary dynamics parameter values; in both DG and AG, dictators190
donate more than required and, in case of AG, receivers expect donations higher than the minimum.191
Mutation affects the results observed in Figure 2A as in12 (see Figures S7 and S8 in Supplementary192
Material).193
Comparing now the average donations for the DG and AG in Figure 2A, one clearly observes that the194
dictators’ anticipation increases the amount they give. The fitting reveals that in both games the same195
selection strength holds for a given mutation probability; the selection strength fits for β ≈ 10−2.2. This196
result is quite intriguing as it provides novel insight into the predictive nature of the stochastic evolutionary197
dynamics model. That is, knowing the selection strength relevant in the DG provides information on the198
selection strength best fitting the average experimental donations in all AG treatments (and vice versa).199
Anticipating acceptance is key to success and generosity200
Although the average behaviour matches nicely with the experiments, the strategy distributions generated201
by the stochastic evolutionary model do not reveal the same close fit. When comparing the heterogeneity202
in the experimental distributions in Figures 1C-E to the distributions produced by the stochastic model (see203
Figures 2B-D), one can observe that although the distributions for the DG and AG peak around the same204
average values, the generated distributions are much broader, including even many more donations above205
5 ECUs than observed in the experiments. The results obtained for the noisy AG model with ω = 0.5 lead206
to even a worse fitting; whereas the treatment 4 shows a peak around 3 and 4 ECU, the model provides207
results peaking around 1 and 2 ECU. This issue is a direct result of how the behaviours of the dictators208
and receivers are modelled: The amount a dictator gives depends here on how she thinks that amount will209
affect her chances to be accepted as a partner in the following rounds. Moreover, although receivers will210
refuse a partner with low previous donations, we might assume that they will not expect dictators to give211
up more than half of the endowment, which they themselves would also do if they would be a dictator.212
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The latter assumption is supported by the experimental results (see Figure 3A). The probability of213
acceptance, which we refer to as α[p], increases with the donation p. Donations bigger than or equal to 5214
ECU are always accepted in all the three AG treatments. The current model with q ∈ [1,10] generates215
acceptance probabilities that are not as stringent: As can be seen in Figure 3B, for different β best fitting216
the average donations (β ≈ 10−2.2), α[5] ≈ 80%. Moreover, even donations up to p = 8 do not reach217
100% acceptance. To address this issue, we restrict the expectation of the receivers to 5, i.e. q ∈ [1,5],218
while keeping the strategies of dictators as before, i.e. p ∈ [1,10]. Under this modification, a receiver with219
q = 5 (the most demanding one) will accept to play with a dictator giving p≥ 5, fitting the probability of220
acceptance on the experimentally observed results as can be seen in Figure 3C.221
This acceptance probability α[p] is also essential for the success of dictators: Dictators that consider
how their donation influences the likelihood of being accepted in the future by another receiver have a
strategic advantage over those that do not take this acceptance into account. The current evolutionary
model ignores the importance of the future acceptance and therefore the future payoff by only using direct
payoff to determine a dictator’s fitness. Following this reasoning we redefine a dictator’s success as a
weighted combination of the current payoff (X− p) and the payoff potentially obtained in the next round
(X− p) multiplied with the acceptance probability associated with the current donation p, resulting in the
following dictator fitness function:
fD(p) =
(X− p)+δ ×α[p]× (X− p)
1+δ
, (1)
where X is the endowment amount and δ ∈ [0,∞) scales the importance of the future payoff in the overall222
fitness of the dictator. For δ = 0 the future success is simply ignored, thus only the current payoff matters,223
recovering the basic stochastic evolutionary dynamics model discussed in the previous section. When224
δ → ∞, the success of the dictators will solely depend on their future payoff. Equation 1 is used when the225
interaction occurs (i.e. when p≥ q). When p < q, the receiver rejects the interaction, resulting in zero226
payoff for the present and the future.227
Results for the AG model with ω = 1 are visualised in Figure 4. As can be observed in Figure 4A228
for a given selection strength β , the more important the future payoff becomes (i.e. the higher the value229
of δ ), the higher the average donation becomes. Or when comparing to the average behaviour observed230
in the AG experiment, the more important future acceptance becomes in the success of dictators, the231
stronger the selection strength needs to be to ensure the fit with the observations. This interplay between232
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selection strength β and future importance δ is further explored in Figure 4B. One can conclude that both233
β and δ parameters are important for fitting the average donations observed in the AG. Increasing the234
future importance δ leads to higher levels of intensity of selection β . Figures 4C-E show the stationary235
distributions of the dictators’ strategies for those configurations of {β , δ} that fit best the average donation236
of 4.2 ECU observed in the AG treatments 2 and 3. For increasing δ the distributions in Figures 4C-E237
become steeper around the average, revealing also a distribution of strategies closer to the AG experimental238
data: In case of δ = 10, 80% of the population consists of individuals giving p ∈ {3,4,5} and also the239
likelihood of having donations higher than 5 is reduced significantly.240
These improvements remain valid and become even more clear when looking at the noisy AG where241
ω = 0.5. As before, the average donations are associated with the same selection strength (see Figure242
S10 in Supplementary Material), reinforcing again the predictive quality of the model for different games.243
More importantly, as is shown in Figure 5, one can see that in order to obtain the distribution of donations244
close to what is observed in treatment 4 (see Figure 1E), one should assume that δ ≈ 10: For this parameter245
value, the distribution also centres around donations of 3 to 4 ECU. In other words, our analysis indicates246
that in our experiments dictators consider their future acceptance significantly more important than what247
they get immediately. As such our extension to the stochastic evolutionary dynamics model provides an248
important improvement in explaining the results one can observe in experiments.249
Discussion250
In this work we have presented the results of a novel behavioural experiment, which we call the Anticipation251
Game or AG, and an evolutionary analysis of those results to understand how acceptance by receivers252
influences the fitting of the stochastic evolutionary dynamics model to this experimental data. The AG253
introduces a voluntary matching phase wherein receivers decide based on the past behaviour of their254
matched dictator whether they want to play the DG. This new game, explicitly introduces a strategic255
concern in the decision process of the dictators; keeping more now will increase the likelihood that the256
future matched receiver will refuse to play the game.257
Three treatments of the AG were performed, varying in the type and amount of information provided258
to the receiver. As expected, the amounts given by the dictators are much higher than those given in the259
DG, and in both DG and AG more is given than the amounts theoretically predicted, under the assumptions260
of rationality and selfish payoff maximisation. Adding more information (i.e. how many times a dictator261
was accepted or refused) did not induce changes in the donations, yet provided a significant change in the262
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acceptance by the receiver. Furthermore, introducing a 50% possibility that the receiver could not observe263
the past behaviour of the dictator, leads to a reduction in the average amount given, without any significant264
changes in the average acceptance level. Nonetheless, the presence or absence of the dictators’ history of265
donations in the decision making process produces significant differences in the average amount given and266
average amount expected within that fourth treatment, underlining again the importance of anticipation in267
the decisions made by dictators. These results provide additional evidence that reputation is essential in a268
partner selection mechanism, as was argued from different perspective in.11269
Using stochastic evolutionary dynamics wherein dictators give a fixed amount and receivers decide270
whether to play conditionally, we observe that the model parameters are predictive for all our four271
treatments. In all cases, the fitting produced the same weak selection β , with dictators always giving more272
than expected (p > q) and receivers expecting more than the minimal amount (q > 1). We show hence273
that the predictions provided by the stochastic model are robust for different variations of the game. This274
remarkable observation is in line with the recent experimental finding in,21, 22 suggesting that there may275
exist a cooperative phenotype, i.e. an individual’s behaviour in one cooperative context is related to his or276
her behaviour in other settings. Nonetheless the heterogeneity in the strategies actions observed in the277
experiments is not recovered by the model.278
We propose here an important extension to the model so as to improve the correlation between the279
distributions of strategies generated by the model and those observed in the different AG treatments. We280
explicitly modelled the anticipation of the dictators with respect to the expectations of the receivers by a281
system-level parameter δ , which determines how important the payoff one may obtain in the next round is282
for the current success of the dictators. Our results show that increasing δ alters the selection strength β283
that best fits the experimental data (and vice versa): The more the future is taken into account the more the284
selection strength needs to increase in order to match the data. Furthermore, the acceptance probabilities285
following from the model fit much better with what we can observe in the experiments and the predictive286
properties of the earlier model are maintained in the extended model, which is supported here by the287
results obtained for the AG and noisy AG (see Figure S10 in Supplementary Material). As such, both288
the probability of acceptance and the δ parameter play an essential role when trying to fit the stochastic289
evolutionary dynamics model to games that include acceptance and future gain concerns.290
Our AG experimental results capture findings similar to what one can expect in the UG,11, 17, 23 yet,291
whereas the concerns of the dictator in our AG are associated with future interactions, the concerns in292
the UG are linked to the game itself. Moreover, there is no voluntary matching occurring in the UG, as293
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both players are expected to play the game even when they might not be interested in their co-player.294
Notwithstanding these differences, the conclusions we draw here might also be extendable to the UG.295
Future work will indicate whether indeed a parameter similar to δ , which represents the strategic concern296
of the proposer, will also bring the stationary distributions of the proposers in the UG closer to the297
distributions of offers observed in UG experiments. It will be now interesting to see whether variations of298
the AG or UG experiment can be defined that would allow us to determine the average δ and its distribution299
from experiments. In addition, models should be designed wherein the parameter δ becomes part of300
the behaviour of the individuals as opposed to being a system-level parameter, exploring the conditions301
that allow individuals that take the future into account to evolve. All these issues go beyond the current302
manuscript and are being analysed in subsequent research.303
Since receivers use the reputation of dictators to decide whether to play or not, this research is304
reminiscent of the evolution of cooperation in systems based on indirect reciprocity.24–26 In those systems305
individuals acquire a reputation based on how they treat other individuals, where a good reputation may306
lead to future benefits provided by other individuals. Evolutionary models have shown that individuals’307
reputation effects may lead to more fair outcomes.27 Nonetheless the current AG work differs from indirect308
reciprocity models, since here the reputation is implicitly determined by the one that directly benefits from309
it: In indirect reciprocity, the reputation is assigned by other players that observe how one individual treats310
the other28 whereas here, an individual determines their reputation directly by accepting a loss now in311
order to guarantee benefits in the future.312
Our work is therefore closer to recent research on competitive altruism.5, 29, 30 Competitive altruism313
is based on three assumptions; 1) individuals should differ in strategy or resources, 2) individuals have314
access to reliable information on the reputation or past actions of their co-players, providing a reliable315
guide to future behaviour and 3) individuals are paired in an assortative manner, meaning that the highest316
contributors have privileged access to the most profitable partners in the partner choice process. As was317
argued in the introduction the latter feature is also implicit to biological market models.1–3, 6 Such a318
preference-based matching is absent in AG as receivers decide to accept a randomly proposed dictator. As319
such our results show that even without having privilege access to the most cooperative individuals, thus320
without an explicit competition between the dictators for partners, generous donations emerge.321
Our stochastic evolutionary model also does not require demography differences or market effects6322
to explain the generosity observed in the experimental work. In order to explain dictators’ generosity in323
the AG it is necessary to take into account the influence of the receivers’ other regarding preferences as324
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well as the dictators’ concern about the possibility of being accepted by the receivers. Hence even in a325
world dictated by stochastic effects, strategic considerations need to be incorporated to provide ultimate326
explanations for generous outcomes observed in experiments with human participants.327
Methods328
Experiment setup329
We performed the DG and AG experiments at the CentERlab of the University of Tilburg, in the Nether-330
lands. Five sessions were performed for the treatments 2, 3 and 4 (all AG variations). For treatment 1 we331
conducted two DG sessions with identical action choices for the dictators as in the AG to ensure a clear332
comparison. The participants were all students of the University of Tilburg, excluding Economy students.333
On average 18 subjects participated per session, earning between 7 to 14 Euros. At the beginning of each334
session, the participants were randomly assigned the role of dictator or receiver, which they maintained for335
the entire session. Then, after drawing a number and being seated to the specified computer accordingly,336
the instructions of the session were read aloud. Afterwards and before playing the game, the participants337
performed a test to ensure that they understood the game. At the start of the AG sessions (initiation phase),338
the subjects first played three rounds of the standard DG, creating an initial history or reputation for each339
dictator. The partner choice phase is then used in the following 27 rounds of the AG. Using the reputation340
information (in case of treatment 2), the receivers decide whether to play or not with a given dictator. If the341
game is not played, they both receive zero payoff and need to wait for the next random matching. When342
playing, the dictators receive an endowment of 10 ECUs and they need to decide how much (between343
1 ECU and 10 ECUs) they will give to the receiver. Once a part of the endowment is transferred to the344
receiver this amount is added to the history of that dictator, replacing the oldest value in the list. This345
update only occurs when the game has been played; otherwise the three-round history remains the same.346
At the end of the session the ECUs gathered by each individual were transformed in a monetary gain.347
A more detailed description of the experimental procedures is provided in Supplementary Material. All348
experimental data is available upon request from the corresponding author.349
Stochastic evolutionary dynamics model350
We analyse the evolutionary dynamics of individual strategies in populations of finite size N.19, 31–33 A351
mix of neutral drift, which accounts for stochastic effects, and natural selection, dictates the dynamics352
in this model. The balance between these two forces is controlled by two parameters: the intensity of353
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selection β and mutation rate µ . In a stochastic process strategies with low fitness will have a small yet354
non-zero chance to survive.355
Although different social dynamics are possible, we assume here that the individual strategies spread356
through the pairwise comparison rule, according to which two individuals A and B are randomly drawn357
from the population at each time step, and then player with strategy A imitates the one playing strategy B358
with probability given by the Fermi distribution function:34, 35359
Prob{A imitates B} = 1
1+ e−β (piB−piA)
,360
where pii denotes the average payoff of player with strategy i after interacting once with every other361
individual in the population. Parameter β denotes the intensity of selection, tuning how much the payoff362
contributes to the fitness of a player. In the limit β → 0, selection does not play any role; neutral drift363
drives the dynamics, i.e. both strategies will have prevailing probabilities proportional to their abundance.364
On the contrary, when β →∞, evolution proceeds deterministically, as the individual with the lower payoff365
will adopt the other individual’s strategy regardless of how large the difference is.366
Assuming this pairwise comparison rule, a Markov chain model can be constructed to describe the367
evolutionary dynamics of A and B strategies in a finite population. The different configurations of the368
population define the states of the Markov chain, ranging from a state with only A strategists to a state369
with only B strategists. The transition probability between any two states indicates the probability that the370
population moves from one state to the other in one time step. We distinguish between two kinds of states,371
the absorbing or homogeneous ones where the population composes of either strategy A or strategy B372
solely, and the transition ones, including the rest of the population compositions. The stochastic nature of373
the dynamics ensures that one of the strategies always survives, i.e. the Markov process will end up in374
either of the two absorbing states.375
More specifically, suppose there are k individuals playing strategy A (0 ≤ k ≤ N) and (N− k) in-









where piA,B stands for the payoff an individual using strategy A obtains in an interaction with another
individual using strategy B. The probability to increase (or decrease) the number k of individuals using










The probability that a single mutant A will take over the whole population of individuals adopting strategy














Considering the Markov process through millions of time steps, mutants may appear and disappear or376
even prevail in the population. The process shall move from one homogeneous state to another following377
the different fixation probabilities, assuming that mutations are rare. Taking into account a set {1, . . . ,q}378









Ti j, of a Markov Chain. The normalised eigenvector associated380
with the eigenvalue 1 of the transposed of M provides the stationary distribution,19, 20, 31 which shows how381
many times a Markov process will reach a homogeneous state or even which is the probability the process382
will end up in a specific homogeneous state after infinite rounds or time steps.383
In AG, we study evolutionary dynamics in bipartite populations, i.e. one population of dictators and384
one population of receivers. Individuals interact between populations, yet evolve within their own. More385
specifically, a homogeneous state corresponds to a pair of strategies, one for dictators and one for receivers.386
Suppose that we are in a homogeneous state and then a mutant A appears in only one of the populations,387
for example the dictators’ population with residents playing B. We do not consider then another mutant388
in the receivers’ population before the previous one either gets fixated or eliminated. Therefore, fixation389
probability of A depends also on the state of the other population (Figure S4 in Supplementary Material).390
As a consequence, a transition between two homogeneous states presupposes that the strategy in one of391
the populations remains the same.392
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Figure 1. Experimental results for all treatments. A. Donation levels vary depending on the treatment. In
the treatment 1 (DG), the dictators give on average 2.2 ECUs. In the treatments 2 and 3 (AG), the amounts
given reach on average 4.2 ECUs. Statistical testing revealed no significant differences for the donations
between treatments 2 and 3. In the noisy AG, donations decrease to an average 3.5 ECUs, which is
significant different from the earlier AG treatments (Welch two sample t-test on average donations per
session,t=3.7491, df=7.982, p-value = 0.005655). B. Receivers’ average acceptance rate per session. Even
if there is no significant difference between the average acceptance levels of treatment 2 and treatment 4,
there is a small yet significant difference in the acceptance levels of treatments 2 and 3 (Welch two-sample
t-test on average acceptance per session:t= -2.4509, df= 5.369, p-value= 0.05449). The donation
distributions C for treatment 1 (DG), D for treatment 2 and 3 (AG) and E for treatment 4 (noisy AG).
Figure 2. A. Average donations given from the dictators and expected by the receivers with respect to
the selection parameter β and the probability ω of knowing the dictator’s previous action according to the
stochastic evolutionary dynamics model (µ = 0.01). The dictators almost always give more when the
approval of the matching lies on the receivers side, apart from when selection gets strong enough leading
to the subgame perfect equilibrium outome. Furthermore the latter, expect less than the amount they will
finally receive (always p > q). Black horizontal dashed lines correspond to the average donations
observed in the experiments, around 4.2 in AG, 3.5 in noisy AG and 2.2 in DG, and the yellow
background indicates this β area fitting them best. The distributions of the strategies of dictators are
shown for the AG (panel B), its noisy variation (panel C), and finally the DG (panel D). A more detailed
analysis of the DG strategy distribution can be seen in Figure S3 in Supplementary Material.
Figure 3. Acceptance probability in experiments and models. A. The results of the AG treatments show
that dictators will always be accepted in the next round once their average donation reaches the half of the
endowment. B. Acceptance probabilities generated by the basic stochastic evolutionary model with
q ∈ [1,10] for different selection strengths β . C. When q ∈ [1,5], the probability of acceptance generated
by the model always converges to 1 for p = 5, brining the results closer to those observed in A.
Figure 4. The role of future acceptance in fitting the experimental results. A. Average dictators’
donation with respect to selection strength β . The more the future’s importance is taken into account the
more we need to increase the intensity of selection β in order to fit our experimental data. B.
Experimental fit for a combination of the selection intensity and the future importance factor β
(combinations annotated with the ”*” represent the average donation observed in treatment 2). C. The
strategy distributions for the combinations of β and δ that fit best the average amount given we observed
in treatment 2. Figure S9 in Supplementary Material shows similar results for the noisy AG, highlighting
even more clearly the importance of acceptance and the payoff obtained in future interactions.
Figure 5. Effect of noise in the future payoff importance model. A. The interplay of the intensity of
selection β with the importance factor δ has the same effect in the average donations as in the AG. By
increasing δ we witness more generous outcomes for a specific value of β . B-D. Distribution of strategies
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Figure S1. The games under study, the Dictator Game (DG) and the Anticipation Game (AG).
Initial endowment is X .
The subgame perfect equilibria for DG i.e. {give1}, and AG, i.e. {Play, give1}, can be2
obtained through backward induction. Note that if the minimum donation had been 0, then the3
receiver in the AGwould have been indifferent between playing and not playing, as in both cases4
she would obtain the same payoff, which is zero. To avoid any confusion in the experiments,5
we decided therefore to make the minimum donation equal to 1, for both games.6
2 Details concerning the experiments7
All experiments were performed in the CentERlab at the University of Tilburg in the Nether-8
lands. The participants of our experiments were all students of the University of Tilburg, ex-9
cluding students with an Economic background as they may be familiar with game theoretic10
concepts. All experiments were performed using z-Tree [1].11
The first experiments, consisting of treatments 1 to 3, were performed in February 2013.12
For treatment 1 we only had 2 sessions for the DG, as the existing literature (see Chapter 213
3
of [2]) provides already substantial information on this type of game . In treatment 2, 5 sessions14
of the Anticipation Game, where receivers know the past three donations of their matched dic-15
tators, were performed. And similarly, 5 sessions were conducted for treatment 3, wherein the16
receivers were given the extra information of how many rounds their partner got rejected in her17
previous interactions.18
At the beginning of each session, the subjects drew a number, specifying the position they19
take in the computer room. Each computer had a predefined role of either dictator or receiver,20
which we annotated as Agent 1 or Agent 2 respectively. The instructions of the session were21
read aloud by one of the experimenters and the participants were asked to complete a small22
questionnaire to check whether they understood the experiment. For treatment 2 the following23




You are about to participate in an experiment on interactive decision-making, con-28
ducted by researchers from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and the Universite´ Libre29
de Bruxelles, and funded by the Belgian fund for the scientific research (Fonds de30
la Recherche Scientifique). In this experiment you will earn some money, and the31
amount will be determined by your choices and by the choices of the other partici-32
pants.33
Your privacy is guaranteed: results will be used anonymously.34
It is very important that you remain silent during the whole experiment, and that35
you never communicate with the other participants, neither verbally, nor in any36
other way. For any doubts or problems you may have, please just raise your hand37
4
and an experimenter will approach you. If you do not remain silent or if you behave38
in any way that could potentially disturb the experiment, you will be asked to leave39
the laboratory, and you will not be paid.40
All your earnings during the experiment will be expressed in Experimental Cur-41
rency Units (ECUs), which will be transformed into Euros with a change rate of 3042
to 1. At the end of the experiment, a show up fee of 5 euros will be added to your43
earnings.44
You will be paid privately and in cash. Other participants will not be informed45
about your earnings.46
Before starting, you will be randomly assigned to the role of Agent 1 or Agent 2,47
and you will maintain the role for the whole experiment. Agents 1 and 2 will form48
pairs of one Agent 1 and one Agent 2 each.49
The experiment is divided in two parts, for a total of 30 rounds. In each round there50
will be a random re-pairing of Agents 1 and 2. Obviously, as the matching rule51
is random and as the number of rounds is larger than the number of participants,52
during the experiment you will be paired more than once with the same subject.53
However, you will never know the identity of the participant you are matched with54
and hence you will not be able to identify your partner.55
56
PART 157
The first part of the experiment consists of 3 rounds. In each round each Agent58
1 receives an endowment of 10 ECUs and has to decide how much to give to the59
Agent 2 that has been matched with him/her. The minimal amount given to Agent60
2 is 1 ECU, the maximal 10 ECUs. After the choice, each Agent 2 will be informed61
5
about the amount that has been given to him/her.62




The second part of the experiment consists of 27 rounds (from round 4 to round67
30). At the beginning of each round a screenshot will show to each Agent 2 what68
the randomly matched Agent 1 gave in the three previous played rounds. Agent 269
will then have to choose whether he/she intends to interact with that specific Agent70
1 or not.71
IF NOT - Agent 2 refuses to interact and both Agent 1 and 2 skip the round, going72
directly to the following one, where they will be matched with new partners. When73
an interaction is refused, both Agent 1 and 2 gain 0 ECUs for that round. Refusals74
are not shown in the screenshot that summarizes the three previous periods.75
IF YES - Agent 2 accepts to interact. Agent 1 receives 10 ECUs and chooses how76
much to give to Agent 2, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 10 ECUs. After77
the choice, each Agent 2 will be informed about the amount that has been given to78
him/her.79
As said, at the beginning of each round a screenshot will present to each Agent 280
what the randomly matched Agent 1 offered in the three previous played rounds.81
Agent 2 therefore will not see if in the previous rounds other Agents 2 refused to82
interact with that specific Agent 1.83
Once the experiment is over, you will have to fill a short questionnaire.84
85
6
After that, your final earnings will be determined. For Agent 1 the final earnings86
(in ECUs) are the sum of all those amounts he/she did not give to his/her Agent 2 in87
those rounds where he/she was accepted by Agent 2. For Agent 2 the final earnings88
are the sum of all those earnings he/she receives from his/her Agent 1 during the89
rounds in which he/she did not refused to interact with Agent 1.90
These final earnings are transformed into Euros with 30 ECUs being equal to 191
euro.92
Your final earning will appear on the screen and the experimenters will explain the93
modality of payment.94
95
Thank you for your participation!96
After reading this text and filling in the questionnaire, the session started. In Figure S2, one97
can observe two of the game screenshots, one for Agent 1 and the other for Agent 2.98
At the end of the experiment, the participants had to reply to a small questionnaire regard-99
ing either their motives of the level of donations they gave (for Agents 1) or the reasons they100
accepted or rejected a certain dictator (for Agents 2).101
Once finished they were then asked to pass by the payment desk to receive their monetary102
gains. On average 18 subjects participated per session, and each participant earned an amount103
of money ranging from 7 to 14 Euros. The same procedure was used for all three treatments.104
The fourth treatment for the noisy AG was performed in November 2013, excluding subjects105
that already participated in the earlier treatments. Average participation was 16 subjects per106
session, earning an amount of money ranging also from 7 to 14 euros. The procedure followed107
was the same as the one described before.108
7
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In this round, your partner has not seen your past decisions and decided to play with you.
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Figure S2. Two example screenshots used during the experimental session. A. A certain
receiver (Agent 2) has to decide whether to accept to play with a certain dictator after
observing her 3 previous donations. This screenshot was taken from treatment 2 (AG). B. A
dictator (Agent 1) in treatment 4 (noisy AG) has to decide how much to give to her partner
after being informed that the latter has not observed her 3 previous donations.
3 Statistical differences in treatment 4 between situations with109
and without reputations110
As briefly described in the main text, we observed differences in the amounts given by the111
dictators and the acceptance rates by the receivers when the latter could observe (or not) the112
previous three donations of their matched dictator. Analysing the results in Figure S5 shows113
that there is a significant difference in the donations (Welch two sample t-test, t=-3.05, df=4114
and p-value = 0.03693) and the acceptance rates (Welch two-sample t-test, t=-3.6685, df=4 and115
p-value = 0.02142) of the noisy AG in the case where there is a history or not. Given the almost116
95% of acceptance rate when receivers cannot observe the dictators’ history (as shown in Figure117
S5B), one might assume in the stochastic modelling that a receiver will almost always accept118
an interaction with a dictator when she does not know how much the dictator gave in previous119
8
Figure S3. Stationary distribution and fixation probabilities in the Dictator Game where each
state corresponds to the amount given from dictators. Even if the most common strategy is the
selfish one of giving 1, there is still a 25% of donating 2 and another 25% allocating from 3 to
5, the latter may be considered as fair players. This distribution matches nicely with the one
we found in our experiments (Figure 1C in the main text). The arrows refer to the fixation
probability of the strategy at the end of them. Dotted lines between states correspond to neutral
drift. Only the transition dynamics referring to state 1 and 10 are shown. All the rest can be
deduced from them, e.g. from state 9 to 6 selection favors the latter with fixation probability of



















Figure S4. Fixation probability ρB,A of a single mutant arriving in dictators’ population. The
mutant plays strategy A when entering in a population of agents playing strategy B. We do not
allow for mutants in receivers’ population; thus their strategy remains steady. Then ρB,A is the
probability the A mutant will prevail within the dictators’ population while interacting with
receivers belonging to the receivers’ population.
4 Receivers’ expectations in the noisy AG when there is no121
information122
As can be observed in Figure S6, for the intermediate selection strength of β = 10−2.2, in-123
creasing ω boosts generosity and therefore dictators’ donations, or putting it differently the less124
receivers know regarding their matched dictators’ behavior, the lower the donations we observe.125
As has already been described in the main text, for ω = 0 and ω = 1, the donations coincide126
with the DG and AG respectively, i.e. around 2.2 and 4.2 ECUs respectively. However, in de-127
termining the average amount expected by the receivers, one needs to take into account that the128
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with history without history
Figure S5. Donation levels and acceptance rate per session for the fourth treatment, the noisy
AG, when receivers obtain or not their matched dictators’ history. Initial endowment is
X = 10.
is absent. Clearly, receivers have different expectations when they obtain and do not obtain130
information about their matched dictator. Figure S6, shows that if one does not adjust the ex-131
pectation, the receivers seem to expect more for decreasing values of ω, leading to the loss of132
one of the inequity aversions: the amount given becomes less than what is expected, which does133
not make much sense in light of the available data. If we assume in the model that the expecta-134
tions are different when information about the past behaviour of the dictator is present or not,135
then we can recover p > q. One can assume for instance that the receivers expect the same as in136
the DG, which is either 1 ECU or the 2.2 ECUs as we have observed experimentally. Then we137
make a weighted combination of the expectation, given by q, for the case when the dictator’s138
history is available (ω) and 1 ECU (or 2.2 ECU) when the history is not available (1 − ω). We139
observe in Figure S6 that by altering the expectation to 1 ECU in the model when the history140
is not available guarantees again that p > q. Moreover, the expectation of the receivers nicely141
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Figure S6. The effect of ω on the average donations given or expected when β = 10−2.2. The
dictators may take advantage of the fact that the receivers are less informed (i.e. lower ω) in
order to donate lower amounts. We depict here 3 different expectation threshold lines for the
receivers with respect to which donation they expect to receive when they do not obtain the
history of their partners.
5 The effect of mutations143
5.1 Agent-based simulations144
In our agent-based computer simulations we defined two distinct populations of size N = 100,145
one for the dictators and one for the receivers. A random strategy is assigned to each individual146
at the beginning of the simulation. We assume 10 different strategies in each population. For147
the dictators this corresponds to the 10 different amounts given {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} and148
for the receivers to their expectance thresholds, i.e. a receiver with strategy 5 will accept to play149
with dictators that give at least 5 meaning the ones that have the strategy of giving {5, 6, 7, 8,150
9, 10}.151
In each generation a random matching is proposed and they all play the game. Then, ac-152
12
cording to the pairwise imitation rule, imitation takes place (with probability 1 − μ) in one of153
the populations only. Two agents i, j are randomly picked and then agent i imitates the agent154
j’s strategy with probability
1
1 + e−β(πj−πi)
, which corresponds to the Fermi distribution func-155
tion [7]. When both populations approximate fixation (meaning at least 90% fixated), then the156
corresponding pair of strategies counter gets raised by 1. Moreover with a certain probability μ157
(mutation rate parameter) one agent’s strategy from one population will change randomly. Each158
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Figure S7. Average donations given by the dictators in function of the selection parameter β
and a specific mutation rate μ. One can notice a slight increase in average donations when the
mutation rate is increased, as was also observed in [9] .
159
We count how many times a certain pair of strategies fixates, and from that, the frequency160
of a pair is determined, giving the stationary distribution. Combining the distributions with the161
agents’ strategies, one can compute the average amount given and average amount expected for162
dictators and receivers respectively. Each simulation (109 generations) for a pair of β and μ is163
repeated for 100 times and averaged afterwards to obtain the final result. Values for mutation164
parameter μ were {0.01, 0.001, 0.0001}. For instance, for μ is 0.01, we have, on average, one165
13
mutation per 100 generations, but only in one of the populations. Results are shown in Figure166
S7.167
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Figure S8. Average donations given from the dictators with respect to intermediate levels of
the selection parameter β when we vary the mutation step. The higher the mutation step, the
larger the range of strategies a mutant may adopt and then randomness gets increased.
We also considered variations in the way mutations may occur. Whereas the earlier form169
(see Figure S7) is global, one can also consider that a strategy can only change to a ”similar”170
strategy. We define here the mutation step as the range of strategies a certain agent may adopt171
around her current strategy. The larger the mutation step the more strategies a mutant may172
switch too. For example, when the mutation step is 1, a dictator playing the strategy 3 can only173
mutate to strategies {2, 3, 4} and not the rest. From the receivers’ side, e.g. when mutation174
step equals to 3, a mutant of the strategy 2 can only mutate to strategies {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The175
results in Figure S8 show the effect of this kind of mutation on the average donations for varying176
the mutation step and β. As can be observed: changing the mutation step has an effect on the177
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selection strength β best fitting the experimental data. The higher the randomness (from step178
size 1 to 5, until global mutation), the higher the β needs to be in order to match the experimental179
results.180
5.3 Mutation under weak selection dynamics181
Suppose a player from the dictators’ population has a strategy of donating a fixed amount p ∈182
[0, 1] when playing, and a proposer form the receivers’ population has a strategy of accepting183
to play when the expected amount from the paired dictator is at least q ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore,184
assuming that with a probability s ∈ [0, 1] the receiver does not have prior information about185
the paired dictator. In that case, we consider that the receiver always accepts to play (as it is the186
rational choice). This probability s corresponds to the (1− ω) as defined in the main text.187
Hence, when these two players meet, their payoffs are given by:188
Adic =

1− p, if p ≥ q





p, if p ≥ q
s ∗ p, otherwise.
(2)
The parameters: N : population size; µ: mutation rate.190
Similarly to Rand [9], we discretize the problem: p = i/m and q = j/m, where m ≥ 1 is
an integer and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. As shown from Otshuki [10], for weak selection, the combination
of dictators’ and receivers’ strategies that is most favoured by selection (i.e. most abundant) is
15















































































































































where IS(i ≥ j) = 1 − s, if i ≥ j, and 0 otherwise. Now let p = i/m and q = j/m.
Substituting i = pm and j = qm and taking the limit m→∞ we obtain:
L(p, q) = IS(i, j)− 2p2(1− s)− q2(1− s) + p(1− 3s) + q(1− s)− (1− 3s)
2
H(p, q) = −p2(1− s)− q
2(1− s)
2
+ q(1− 2s) + s
2
Hence, we can show that, for large N , the most abundant combination of strategies (popt, qopt)191









, if 2Nµ ≤ 1 + s
1− 2s(
1 + 2Nµ(1− 2s)− 3s







With s = 0 we recover the results obtained in Rand [9]. For increasing s, both the optimal p193
and q decrease for small mutation rates, and for larger mutation rates only p values decreases.194
6 Extended stochastic model for the noisy AG195
The acceptance probability α[p], mentioned in the main text (Figure 3), stipulates how likely it196






















0.25 δ = 10
β = 10 -1.9
δ = 1
β = 10 -2.1
δ = 0
β = 10 -2.3
Average observed
in experiments
























        























        



























































Figure S9. Effect of noise in the future payoff importance model. A. The interplay of the
intensity of selection β with the importance factor δ has the same effect in the average
donations as in the AG. By increasing δ we witness more generous outcomes for a specific
value of β. B-D. Distribution of strategies for this β that fits best the experimental average,
when future payoff importance is δ = {0, 1, 10}. Initial endowment, X = 10.
17
The new fitness function, which takes into account also the future payoff, can also be intro-198
duced in the noisy AG model, yet in that case one also has to consider the fitness of a dictator199
when her donation is less than what is expected (p < q). In that case one obtains :200
fD(p) = ((X − p)× (1− ω)× (1 + δ))/(1 + δ) = (X − p)× (1− ω) (4)
One immediately notices that in that situation δ does not play a role. This makes perfect sense201
as the dictator will benefit from the payoff of the next round only if her matched receiver will202
not know her strategy.203
The Figure S9A, which is the same as Figure 5 in the main text, shows the average donations204
according to the selection strength β, under low mutation rates, for varying δ parameter. We205
notice again (as in Figure 4 of the main paper) that the importance parameter δ promotes gen-206
erosity the more it gets increased. In Figure S9B one can see the effect of δ in the distribution207
of dictators strategies in the noisy AG. These distributions results are intriguing as they show208
that for increasing δ the strategy distribution gets closer and closer to the one observed in the209
experiments. Hence, this result (δ = 10) shows that the dictators in the experiments consider210
acceptance and as a consequence future gains as highly important.211
Finally, in Figure S10, one may observe that our extension to the stochastic evolutionary212
dynamics model fits the experimental acceptance rates while maintaining the predictive capacity213
of the model between treatments.214
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